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When consumers have private information about risk of suffering a loss, or equivalently, 
if insurers are prohibited from using observable information on risk in underwriting, 
theoretical models of insurance predict adverse selection. Yet the most common finding 
in empirical studies is that of no positive correlation between risk and insurance 
coverage. This is found for different types of insurance (e.g. car, health, life) and in 
different countries (e.g. France, US, UK, Israel) suggesting a fundamental relationship 
involving private information and consumer preferences. In this paper, we investigate the 
nature of risk selection in the Australian market for private health insurance in which 
community rated private health insurance complements a universal public health care 
system. We use National Health Survey data on hospital utilisation and individual 
characteristics to construct an empirical analogue for the risk variable in the Rothschild 
and Stiglitz model. Estimating the relationship between insurance and risk semi-
parametrically, we find robust evidence of favourable selection. To explore the extent to 
which underlying risk preferences rather than risk drives the decision to purchase health 
insurance, we use Household Expenditure Survey data to model decisions to purchase a 
range of insurance products (health, life, accident, home, car) and to engage in risky 
behaviours (smoking and various forms of gambling). Correlations between residuals in 
the model suggest that advantageous selection is driven by risk aversion, which 
theoretical models do not typically capture.  
  
1.  Introduction 
A basic prediction of theoretical models of insurance is that when consumers 
have private information about their risk of suffering a loss - or , equivalently, if 
insurers are prohibited from using observable information on risk in underwriting - 
insurance markets will be prone to adverse selection.  Market equilibria with adverse 
selection are characterized by a positive relationship between risk and the level of 
insurance coverage.
1  In recent years, a number of studies have tested this prediction 
using data from different types of insurance markets. The results provide little 
evidence of adverse selection and several studies find exactly the opposite: the level 
of insurance coverage is negatively related with consumer risk. This is found in health 
insurance markets in the US (Ettner, 1997; Cardon and Hendel, 2001; Monheit and 
Vistnes, 2004; Asinski, 2005; Bajari et al, 2006; Fang, Keane and Silverman, 2008), 
in the UK (Propper, 1989), in Israel (Shmueli, 2001) and in Australia (Doiron, Jones, 
Savage, 2008. It is also found in the US market for long term care (Finkelstein and 
McGarry, 2006) and for life insurance (Cawley and Philipson, 1999). Chiappori and 
Salanie (2000) using data on car insurance in France and find no relationship between 
the level of coverage and the incidence of claims. In contrast, Finkelstein and Poterba 
(2002, 2004) do find evidence of adverse selection in the UK market for annuities.   
Broadly, there are two possible explanations for the finding that adverse selection 
is not an issue in insurance markets.  One is that the information asymmetries that are 
central to theoretical models of insurance markets are not empirically important.  
According to this argument, insurers are able to obtain enough information from 
consumers to adequately predict their losses and set premiums accordingly.  It is 
conceivable that in some cases, insurers will have better information than consumers 
concerning expected losses.   
The second possible explanation is that there are other factors that positively 
influence the demand for insurance and are negatively correlated with the risk of 
suffering a loss. For example, if consumers who are more risk averse are also less 
likely to suffer a loss - perhaps because they are more inclined to undertake 
preventive efforts - the positive correlation between risk and insurance coverage due 
to adverse selection will be attenuated or, perhaps even reversed. The most common 
                                                 
1 More generally, asymmetric information can lead to both adverse selection and moral hazard, both of 
which will result in a positive correlation between the level of coverage and ex post losses.     
  
explanation for the counterintuitive result offered in the literature is that of 
heterogeneity in risk aversion; the degree of risk aversion is negatively correlated with 
risk class (de Meza and Web, 2001; Jullien et al, 2002; Finkelstein and McGarry, 
2006).  
In this paper, we investigate the nature of risk selection in the Australian market 
for private health insurance.  Several features of this market make it an important case 
for understanding the general issue of risk selection in insurance markets and for 
informing regulatory policy.  First, much of the prior research on adverse selection in 
health insurance markets has used data from the US, which is an outlier among 
industrialized countries in both the importance of private insurance in financing health 
care and the link between coverage and employment.  Both have important 
implications for risk selection.  In contrast, Australia is more typical of other countries 
in the way that private health insurance complements a universal public health care 
system.  In particular, the Australian public health system provides universal, free 
public hospital treatment but private insurance can be purchased for private hospital 
treatment which, while usually involving out-of-pocket costs, allows choice of 
medical practitioner and shorter waiting times for some procedures.
2  
A second key feature of the Australian market is that premiums are required to be 
community rated: for a given contract the same price must be charged to all 
consumers regardless of age, gender or any other individual characteristics.
3  By 
prohibiting insurers from basing premiums on readily observable risk factors, 
community rating essentially introduces a strong form of information asymmetry into 
the market, which simplifies the interpretation of our results.  If the data reject the 
prediction of adverse selection, the explanation cannot be that information is 
effectively symmetric in this market. As in other countries, Australian insurers can 
design policies to attract low or high risks by excluding coverage for specific 
procedures or types of care or by cost-sharing arrangements, and this could reduce the 
extent of adverse selection in the insured population. However on the basis of US 
findings, there is little evidence of cream skimming in the Australian health insurance 
system. 
                                                 
2 The Australian system does not allow private insurance for costs associated with out of hospital 
medical consultations or diagnostic tests. 
3 Community rating was somewhat relaxed by a policy change in 2000, which allowed insurers to 
charge a uniform premium loading for new entrants aged over 30: the premium for each policy was 2% 
higher for each year older than 30.  
  
Typically several ex ante indicators of risk conditions (demographics, self 
assessed health, risk behaviours) are used to model the impact of risk on insurance.  
This approach makes it difficult to disentangle the drivers of risk. Instead we 
construct an ex post risk measure, an empirical analogue for the risk variable in the 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model. Risk is measured by the predicted probability of 
a hospital admission in the last 12 months. To allow flexibility in the estimated 
relationship between insurance and risk, we adopt the semi-parametric approach of 
Yatchew (1997) controlling for many factors including income, education, country of 
birth, family type, labour market status and region. Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom about the impact of community rating on risk selection, but consistent with 
recent studies by Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and Fang, Keane and Silverman 
(2008), we find strong evidence of advantageous selection into private health 
insurance in Australia. This suggests that underlying risk preferences may drive the 
findings of advantageous selection in health insurance markets.  
To explore this further, we investigate individual decisions to purchase different 
insurance products for which risks are unlikely to be correlated. We estimate a 
multivariate probit model of insurance demands (health, sickness, home contents, 
appliance repairs, life and comprehensive car insurance) and risky behaviours 
(smoking and various forms of gambling). We find large and significant correlations 
between residuals in the model which suggests that underlying risk preferences are 
driving the findings of advantageous selection.  
2.  Theoretical Background 
A natural starting point for considering the issue of risk selection in insurance 
markets is the seminal paper by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).  In their model, high 
and low risk consumers are differentiated by a single parameter, the probability of 
suffering a loss.  When insurers can directly observe each consumer’s risk type both 
types will be offered actuarially fair premiums and will choose to fully insure.  When 
a consumer’s risk type is private information, the model predicts adverse selection.  In 
the Rothschild and Stiglitz model, the only feasible equilibrium is a separating 
equilibrium in which high risks purchase a greater quantity of insurance than low 
risks.  This prediction of a positive correlation between risk and insurance coverage is 
the focus of much of the empirical literature on risk selection. Theoretical models of 
insurance in the Rothschild and Stiglitz tradition typically impose a single utility 
  
function across risk classes and this excludes correlation between risk preferences and 
risk class.  
The Rothschild-Stiglitz model applies most directly to cases where there is only 
private insurance and not purchasing coverage is equivalent to self-insuring.  In the 
case of health insurance, this feature fits the US market, where for most non-elderly 
consumers, private insurance is the only option available. It does not not fit the 
situation in nearly every other industrialized country, where the public sector is the 
primary source of health insurance.  Olivella and Vera-Hernandez (2006) modify the 
Rothschild-Stiglitz model to incorporate a public sector that provides partial insurance 
coverage.  They distinguish between two types of private insurance: supplemental, 
which provides reimbursement for co-payments and services not covered by public 
insurance, and substitute, which covers the same services as the public program, but 
provides patients access to more timely care and, perhaps, higher quality.  According 
to their model, the problem of adverse selection is most acute in the latter case.  Their 
model predicts a strong form of separation: high risks will purchase private insurance 
while low risks will rely entirely on the public system as illustrated in Figure 1.
4     
Figure 1 near here 
Different results can arise if individuals differ in their risk preferences.  
Hemenway (1990) notes that the standard adverse selection prediction can be reversed 
if individuals who are highly risk avoiding are both more likely to purchase insurance 
and to take efforts to reduce the risk of experiencing a loss.  He gives several 
examples, such as the case of motorcycle riders.  A model assuming that all 
consumers are equally risk averse would predict that motorcycle riders should be 
more likely then others to purchase health insurance because they face a greater risk 
of injury.  But, in fact, motorcycle riders are actually less likely to be insured, 
presumably reflecting a higher than average taste for risk.  
In de Meza and Webb (2001) favourable selection can be generated with different 
risk aversions under imperfect competition. Karagoyozova and Siegelman (2006) 
allow for flexible correlation between risk aversion and riskiness across a continuum 
of types and find that an equilibrium with favourable selection requires the insured 
                                                 
4 Gans and King (2003) modify the Rothschild-Stiglitz model in a similar fashion and obtain 
comparable results.  Finkelstein (2004) provides a good discussion of how the relationship between the 
coverage offered by public and private insurance can affect risk selection in the private market.  Her 
conclusions are similar to those of Olivella and Vera-Hernandez.    
  
have moderate uncertainty about their own riskiness. Jullien, Salanie and Salanie 
(2007) develop a model that can imply positive, negative, or (approximately) zero 
correlation between risk and coverage; a favourable selection requires private risk-
aversion and a non-competitive insurance market. Chiappori, Jullien, Salanie et 
Salanie (2002) develop testable hypotheses in a very general model which requires 
data on insurance policies and claims.  
Another standard assumption in the theoretical literature is that there is a single 
type of loss against which consumers can insure.  In reality, health insurance contracts 
represent a bundle of reimbursed services.  Within certain regulatory constraints, the 
bundle of services covered and the quality of that coverage is determined by insurers.  
Frank,Glazer and McGuire (2000) show that when insurers cannot perfectly observe 
consumer risk types, they have an incentive to engage in service-level rationing: over-
providing services that are likely to be used by low risks and skimping on those that 
tend to be used by high risks.  Ellis and McGuire (2007) build on this model by 
showing how these incentives depend on their predictability (how well the demand for 
a service can be anticipated) and predictiveness (the extent to which spending on a 
service is correlated with total spending).  They show that when insurers cannot 
charge risk-based premiums, they have an incentive to under-provide services for 
which the demand is highly predictable and highly predictive, and over-provide those 
that score low on both metrics.  By altering the mix of services in this way, insurers 
can counter the tendency toward adverse selection inherent to markets with 
asymmetric information.  Cao and McGuire (2003) find evidence of this type of 
strategic behaviour by private health maintenance organizations participating in the 
US Medicare program.  
3.  Private Health Insurance in Australia 
Private health insurance in Australia covers hospital care, including treatment at free-
standing same-day facilities and ancillary services, such as dental care, chiropractic 
treatment and optical services.  Private insurance cannot cover outpatient physician 
services or prescription drugs, which are financed by a universal public insurance 
program (Medicare) and by direct payments from patients. Government funding for 
Medicare comes predominantly from general tax revenues although there is a 
Medicare Levy of 1.5% of taxable income which, in 2003-04, funded 16% federal 
government health expenditure and 11% of government health expenditure.  
  
Because there are no out-of-pocket costs for treatment of public patients in public 
hospitals, demand is rationed using waiting lists.  As a result, a primary benefit of 
private hospital insurance is the ability to reduce waiting times by receiving care in a 
private facility.
5  Private hospitals in Australia tend to be smaller and less 
comprehensive than public hospitals and tend to focus on elective procedures for 
which public sector capacity constraints are most severe.  For instance, waiting times 
are particularly long for orthopaedic surgery: in 2004-05 the median time on a public 
hospital waiting list for knee replacement was 152 days, with roughly one quarter of 
patients waiting more than a year.  In that year, private hospitals performed 70% of all 
knee replacements.  Similarly, private hospitals provide the majority of other 
procedures with relatively long public hospital waiting lists, such as endoscopy and 
ophthalmic procedures.
6  It is notable that the types of procedures for which the 
private sector is the dominant supplier in Australia are ones that score low in terms of 
Ellis and McGuire’s (2007) measures of predictability and predictiveness, and 
therefore are those likely to attract favourable risks.    
Private health insurance contracts must be sold on a community rated basis and 
no individual can be excluded from the purchase of any offered contract.  However, 
health insurers have flexibility in the way they design their products.  Insurers’ 
choices regarding what treatments to cover and how to market different products have 
implications for risk selection.  Some types of care that Ellis and McGuire (2007) find 
attract high risks, such as hospice and home care, are legislatively excluded from 
private health cover in Australia. Furthermore, procedures which Australian insurers 
commonly exclude, such as orthopaedic, ophthalmic and obstetrics procedures attract 
relatively low risks according to Ellis and McGuire. Most contracts have the option of 
specified deductibles but no contracts offer coinsurance.  
Medical practitioners set their own fees for services to private inpatients. For 
each item listed on the Medical Benefits Schedule, the government reimburses a fixed 
amount. For insured patients some part of the gap between the fee and the subsidy is 
covered by the insurer. In principle, it is possible for patients to face zero gap 
payments if they choose hospitals and medical providers listed with their insurer. 
                                                 
5 Private insurance can also be used in a public hospital to obtain a private room or to ensure one’s 
choice of doctor.  However, roughly 80 percent of hospital days reimbursed by private insurance are in 
private hospitals.   
6 In 2004-05, 74% of same day colonoscopies and 77% of lens procedures were performed privately. 
  
However, providers can choose whether to accept the insurer’s payment or to charge a 
higher fee to the patient on a patient or episode basis.  As a result, any private 
inpatient episode may involve an out-of-pocket gap payment for medical services 
which can be substantial and unknown prior to admission.  
The insurance regulator administers a reinsurance pool which redistributes funds 
between insurers on the basis of their risk profile determined by the proportion of 
clients aged over 65 or with hospital stays exceeding 35 days per year.
7 This reduces 
the incentive to design contracts to select lower risks.  
From the introduction of the universal public health system, Medicare, in 1984 
there was a steady decline in the proportion of the population with private insurance 
cover. The decline has been portrayed as an adverse selection death spiral that would 
impose unsustainable pressures on the public hospital system if it were allowed to 
continue. (Butler, 1999; Hall et al 1999). To arrest the decline, between 1997 and 
2000 the Australian Government introduced a series of incentives for Australians to 
purchase private health insurance. These policies include an income tax surcharge for 
uninsured high income individuals and families, a 30% subsidy on health insurance 
premiums, and selective age-based premium increases for those enrolling after a 
deadline. 
The demand for private insurance has been examined using the ABS National 
Health Surveys (NHS) undertaken between 1983 and 2001. Prior to the insurance 
incentives, Schofield et al (1997) find that low income families were most affected by 
rising premiums but there was also a decline in the proportion of middle income 
families with private cover. Using the 1989 NHS, Savage and Wright (2003) find a 
strong association between demand for insurance and income. Barrett and Conlon 
(2003) test for a change in adverse selection between the NHS surveys of 1989 and 
1995. They find adverse selection related to age (a positive age gradient) but mixed 
results with respect to various measures of health risks. 
Ellis and Savage (2008) use NHS 2001 to estimate a model of individual 
decisions to enroll in private health insurance order to understand the effects of the 
PHI reforms on the age and income distribution of those with private cover over time. 
They find that the positive impact of income on private coverage was reinforced by 
                                                 
7 Changes to the reinsurance arrangements were introduced in 2007. 
  
the insurance incentives. There was also a broadening in the age distribution of 
private health insurance, suggesting a reduction in adverse selection.  Using 
administrative data Butler (2002) examines the changing age composition of the 
insured pool following the insurance incentives, and observes that the increasing 
average age of those insured suggests the possible reappearance of an adverse 
selection dynamic. Lu and Savage (2006) and Dawkins et al (2004) find little 
evidence that the policies alleviated the burden of public hospitals. Vaithianathan 
(2004) argues that the subsidy to health insurance was ineffective, despite community 
rating, because low risks purchased less cover.  
Doiron, Jones and Savage (2008) investigate the relationship between ex ante risk 
and private health insurance using NHS 2001 and find that conditional on age, people 
with private cover report higher self-assessed health on average than people without. 
They investigate the factors responsible for favourable selection and find that those 
who engage in risk-taking behaviours (especially smoking) are simultaneously less 
likely to be in good health and less likely to buy insurance. 
Fiebig, Savage and Viney (2006) provide evidence on the different motivations 
that people have for buying health insurance using the 2001 NHS. Very few 
respondents give reasons that are suggestive of adverse selection.  Risk 
aversion/peace of mind is a more common motivation as are financial considerations 
especially for those who purchased their cover at the time of the insurance incentives. 
There is clear evidence that preferences concerning “substitute” private health 
insurance are likely to be correlated with income.  The main benefits of such coverage 
are the ability to obtain faster access to health care by avoiding public hospital waiting 
lists, a higher level of service amenities and, perhaps, a higher quality of care.  The 
fact that the demand for these characteristics is likely to be positively related to 
income combined with a positive relationship between income and health is likely to 
contribute to advantageous selection.  
4.  Estimation  
Our analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we use data from the NHS 2004-05 to 
develop an ex post risk measure and estimate the semiparametric relationship between 
the probability of having private health insurance and predicted risk. Second, we use 
data from the HES 2003-04 to estimate a multivariate probit model of insurance 
  
demands and risky behaviours. Our focus is on the correlations between residuals in 
the model.  
To develop our risk measure, the probability of hospital admission in the previous 
12 months is modelled using a binary probit regression:  
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where X includes demographic and socioeconomic variables, health concession card 
status, self-assessed health status, risk behaviours and long term conditions. We also 
include insurance status in the model but exclude insurance when predicting risk 
class.  
We estimate the relationship between insurance status and predicted risk using 
the semi-parametric approach of Yatchew (1997, 1998). The dependent variable   is 
an indicator variable for individual i’s insurance status. The conditional mean 
insurance probability is a linear regression function of a number of controls,  and a 
non-linear function of the predicted risk for individual i, 
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The data is ordered by predicted risk and differencing is used to remove the non-
parametric effects of risk. We use 10
th order differencing with optimal weights to 
improve the efficiency of the OLS estimator in the parametric regressions. The 
parameters,β , of the linear component of the model are estimated on the differenced 
data. The parameters are then applied to the non-differenced data and subtracted from 
the insurance dummy. The form of the function between the adjusted insurance and 
the predicted risk is estimated non-parametrically. 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i i i i R g R g z z I ε ε β β β + ≅ + + − = − ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ     (3) 
The approximation in equation (3) holds because  converges sufficiently quickly 
to
β ˆ
β .  
In the second part of the analysis, we estimate a 12 equation multivariate probit 
model, by the method of maximum simulated likelihood using the GHK simulator. 
  
The model includes six forms of insurance (health, sickness, home contents, appliance 
repairs, life and comprehensive car insurance), smoking and five forms of gambling: 
(lotteries, lotto, off-course horse racing, poker machines and other gambling). The 
explanatory variables include socio-demographics and expenditures on prescriptions 
and specialist consultations as indicators of health status. We estimate the off-
diagonal elements of the error correlations. The simulated likelihood function for the 
sample as a whole is then maximized using maximum likelihood  
5.  Data and results 
5.1.  National Health Survey 2004-05 
The 2004-05 NHS is a representative sample of 19,501 private dwellings across 
Australia. The survey collected information about health status of the population, 
including long term medical conditions; health–related aspects of people's lifestyle, 
such as smoking, exercise and alcohol consumption; use of health services such as 
consultations with doctors and dentists, visits to hospital; and demographic and socio–
economic characteristics. Within each selected household a random sub-sample of 
usual residents was selected for inclusion in the survey comprising one adult (18 years 
of age and over) and one child aged 0 – 17 years. A total of 25,906 respondent records 
(19,501 adult records and 6,405 child records) are included in the data set. From the 
initial adult sample of 19,501 we delete observations corresponding to persons aged 
less than 20, dependents, and those with missing information for insurance status. 
Since we study the purchase of health insurance, it is not appropriate to consider 
children and other dependents as independent observations, however since dependents 
are covered by family policies we include family type in the controls. The remaining 
sample consists of 19,012 observations (8,658 males and 10,354 females).  
Table 1 near here 
In Table 1 we provide the means for the variables used in the risk model. In the 
estimation, we split the sample by sex to capture the different profile of risk of 
hospitalisation by males and females. The table confirms that females are more likely 
to be hospitalised and slightly more likely to be insured. They are less likely to be 
overweight or obese and less likely to exercise, indulge in risky alcohol consumption 
or smoke. They are also more likely to have one or more of a variety of major health 
conditions. Females are more likely to be in lower deciles of household equivalised 
  
income. The choice to use the decile of equivalised household income was driven by 
its availability in the data. The OECD equivalent scale was used by the ABS to 
construct the variable. 
In the probit model of risk of hospitalisation we include an insurance dummy 
variable to capture any moral hazard impact of insurance on hospitalisation. Risk is 
predicted excluding the insurance dummy. We find for both males and females, that 
risk is significantly higher for those with worse self-assessed health, high Kessler 
scores, more long term conditions, or with diagnoses of cancer or heart and 
circulatory conditions. Diabetes increases risk for males and arthritis has a similar 
impact for females. The only condition with a negative risk impact is high cholesterol 
for males. The impact of income unit type is distinctly different by sex: single males 
have higher risk as do females with a partner and children. The only impact of income 
is to increase risk for males in lower deciles of equivalent income. (The probit results 
are available on request.) 
Table 2 near here 
Table 2 presents the means of selected explanatory variables by quintile of 
predicted risk, split by sex. For males, the predicted probability of hospitalisation rises 
from 4.8% in the lowest quintile to 30.9% in the highest quintile. The corresponding 
risks for women are slightly higher but with approximately the same range. The age 
gradient by risk is more pronounced for males (from 43% in quintile 1 to 63% in 
quintile 5). For females the gradient is relatively flat at around 50%. Conditions and 
self assessed health show the expected relationship across risk quintiles while the 
commonly found negative gradient of hospitalisation with income is evident for both 
males and females.  
The profile of the semiparametric relationship between private health insurance 
and predicted risk is shown in Figure 2. The risk densities are shown in the lower part 
of the figure. This shows the impact of risk after controlling for other factors. In the 
parametric part of the model, we include variables generally found to be associated 
with insurance (income, income unit type, education, region and country of birth), a 
variable for ancillary demand (wearing glasses) and two variables to capture risk 
attitudes (smoking and checking skin for moles). For both males and females we find 
  
that the independent impact of risk on insurance is negative indicating favourable 
selection into private health insurance.  
Figure 2 near here 
One explanation for this result could be the impact of the private health insurance 
incentives introduced by the government between 1997 and 2000 which encouraged 
younger, healthier and higher income individuals to purchase insurance. To 
investigate this we estimate the form of the non-parametric relationship between risk 
of hospitalisation and private insurance cover in the NHSs of 1989, 2001 and 2004-
05. All three show a similar negative relationship, as shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 3 near here 
To further explore the relationship we use information from the NHS 2004-05 on 
stated reason for purchasing insurance. Multiple responses are possible and reasons 
can be classified into four non- mutually exclusive categories (financial, security, 
choice and health reasons). Table 3 shows that health reasons provide the smallest 
motivation for insurance purchase for both males and females but, not surprisingly, 
that those with health reasons have the highest risk of hospitalisation.  
Table 3 near here 
We re-estimate the semiparametric model separately for each of the four groups. 
In each case the sample used in the probit model, is the group defined by reason of 
purchase and the uninsured. Figure 3 shows the impact of risk on insurance for these 
groups controlling, as before, for other factors impacting in insurance choice. The 
most distinct result is the adverse selection for the health group. We conclude that the 
finding of favourable insurance selection overall is because the large majority of 
people purchasing health insurance are doing so for reasons other than health.  
Figure 4 near here 
In our estimation, we control for income, age and other observables. What 
remains are unobservables. For example, if the unobserved factors that make 
individuals more risk averse lead them to take preventive effort to lower their health 
risk, we could observe a favourable selection into private health insurance. This is 
illustrated in Figure 4 for an extreme case where the low risk group are perfectly risk 
  
averse and the high risk group are risk neutral. The setting is a mixed public-private 
health insurance system.  
5.2.  Analysis of the Household Expenditure Survey 2003-04 
With different forms of insurance, risk of loss is often uncorrelated as, for 
example, between home contents insurance and health insurance. To explore the role 
of risk preferences, it is interesting to analyse whether the unobservables that make 
individuals purchase different forms of insurance are correlated. We investigate this 
using data on insurance purchases, smoking and gambling behaviours from the 
Household Expenditure Survey 2003-04. The survey was conducted on a sample of 
dwellings throughout Australia from July 2003 to June 2004. The 6,957 households 
excluded non–private dwellings (such as hospitals, institutions, nursing homes, hotels 
and hostels) and dwellings in collection districts defined as very remote or indigenous 
communities. Information was collected from all persons aged 15 years and over in 
the selected household. Personal interviews were conducted and survey participants 
were also required to record in a diary all their expenditures over a two week period.  
Table 4 near here 
We select a sample where the household reference person is aged over 19 years. 
From the expenditure data we create six dummy variables for insurance purchases 
(positive expenditure), one for smoking (positive expenditure) and five for different 
forms of gambling (positive or negative expenditures). Table 4 presents data means 
for the full set of HES variables used in our analysis, for the full sample and 
separately by private health insurance status. There appears to be a strong association 
between health insurance purchase and the purchase of other kinds of insurance. For 
example, while 75% of the sample has home contents insurance, about 90% of those 
with health insurance also have contents insurance compared with 58% of those 
without private health cover. There is a very similar relationship for comprehensive 
car insurance. In contrast, the rate of smoking for households with no private health 
insurance is almost double that of insured households. There is no relationship 
between health insurance and gambling behaviours evident in the raw data. 
Households with private health insurance are more likely to fall in the middle of the 
age distribution, have higher values of socioeconomic variables and live in cities. 
Table 5 near here 
  
Table 5 presents the raw correlations between the indicator variables for risk 
behaviours. There are high and significant positive correlations between most 
insurance purchases and smaller significant positive correlations between gambling 
behaviours. Tobacco consumption forms a link between the two: significant negative 
correlations with categories of insurance and significant positive correlations with 
most forms of gambling. 
Parameter estimates from the multivariate probit model are presented in Table 6. 
Expenditures on prescriptions and specialist consultations are included in the health 
insurance equation as the best available indicators of lower health status. Income 
positively impacts on all insurance purchases and all forms of gambling except poker 
machines. Level of wealth increases the probability of purchasing health, life and 
home contents insurance and lowers the probability of purchasing lotto tickets. 
Tobacco consumers have lower income and lower wealth.
8  
Table 6 near here 
The pattern of residual correlations from the multivariate probit model presented 
in Table 7 provides insights into the motivations for the behaviours we model. We 
control for many demographic and socioeconomic characteristics yet a strong pattern 
of residual correlations remains. We find that unobservable factors generate insurance 
purchases across a range of insurance products for which the risk of adverse outcomes 
are unlikely to be correlated. Similarly unobservables that increase the probability of 
lotto purchases simultaneously increase the likelihood of engaging in other forms of 
gambling. There are few significant residual correlations between categories of 
insurance and forms of gambling; in only one case do we find a significant negative 
correlation (between appliance repair insurance and TAB betting on races). Again the 
residuals for the tobacco equation have significant negative correlations with most 
insurance equations and significant positive correlations with the gambling equations. 
The unobservables that increase the likelihood of smoking reduce insurance purchases 
and increase involvement in gambling.   
                                                 
8 We undertake a number of specification tests to establish that the full model is preferred. A test of the 
12-equation multivariate probit against 12 individual probit regressions has a LR stat of 1,061, well 
above the critical test vale. We also test for a block-diagonal specification, comparing the full model to 
2 separate 6-equation multivariate probits. The LR stat = 246 and the full model is preferred. We test 
the full model against a 5 insurance equation and a 7 tobacco and gambling equation. The  LR stat = 
127 and the full model is preferred.  
 
  
Table 7 near here 
6.  Conclusions 
In our analysis of the NHS data we find evidence of favourable selection into 
private health insurance for both males and females. One potential explanation for this 
is that level of health risk is negatively associated with risk aversion: individuals who 
are risk averse are more likely to insure and more likely to engage in behaviours that 
reduce health risk. Models of insurance in the style of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) 
often fail to capture this potential relationship and this contributes to the empirical 
puzzle of favourable insurance selection. 
Because we do not have any direct evidence on individual risk aversion, we 
attempt to separate risk class and risk preferences using household expenditure data. 
We estimate a multivariate probit model which includes 6 insurance equations, a 
tobacco use equation and 5 gambling equations. We find positive and significant 
correlations between the residuals in the insurance and gambling equations, consistent 
with a risk preference interpretation for favourable selection. While we find only one 
significant negative correlation between insurance and gambling, the tobacco equation 
provides a link between insurance and gambling behaviours: tobacco residuals are 
negatively correlated with insurance purchase and positively associated with 
gambling behaviours. Because risks associated with the difference insurance 
categories are unlikely to be correlated, we interpret our results as providing evidence 
for the motivating unobservables to be associated with risk preferences. In the 
Australian setting our results suggest that favourable selection into health insurance is 
more about risk preferences than selection by insurers. In the absence of data on risk 
aversion, abstention from tobacco appears to be a reasonable proxy for risk aversion.  
Further direct evidence could provide more insights. Individual level data on 
selected insurance plan, premiums on available plans and claims could be used to test 
favourable selection using extent of cover (Chiappori, et al 2002, Finkelstein & 
McGarry, 2003). This is more easily implemented in a setting where there is a strong 
form of community rating. 
There are number of potential policy implications associated with insurance 
selection. In a Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibrium with adverse selection, 
transfers from low risks to high risks improves welfare. If there is favourable 
  
insurance selection, de Meza & Webb (2001) find that a tax on insurance is welfare 
improving. Australia provides large premium subsidies for private health insurance 
(from 30% to 40%). The empirical evidence indicates that these subsidies are directed 
to higher income individuals with relatively low health risks. Alternative ways of 
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Table 1: National Health Survey 2004-05 variable means by sex 
Males Females Males Females
hospital admission 0.152 0.191 BMI<16 0.001 0.003
insured 0.458 0.461 BMI 16 to <17 0.001 0.006
concession card 0.321 0.448 BMI 17 to <18.5 0.005 0.026
age 19 to 24 0.071 0.068 BMI 18.5 to <20 0.023 0.060
age 25 to 29 0.078 0.077 BMI 20 to <25 0.318 0.376
age 30 to 34 0.103 0.097 BMI 25 to <30 0.407 0.248
age 35 to 39 0.104 0.105 BMI 30 to <40 0.172 0.148
age 40 to 44 0.112 0.103 BMI 40 or more 0.012 0.016
age 45 to 49 0.103 0.094 BMI missing 0.061 0.117
age 50 to 54 0.090 0.084 Exercise high 0.075 0.036
age 55 to 59 0.087 0.082 Exercise moderate 0.251 0.228
age 60 to 64 0.075 0.067 Exercise low 0.333 0.391
age 65 to 69 0.056 0.056 Sedentary (very low exercise) 0.004 0.007
age 70 to 74 0.047 0.057 Sedentary (no exercise) 0.336 0.337
age 75 to 79 0.037 0.050 Exercise missing 0.000 0.000
age 80 to 84 0.021 0.039 Alcohol high risk 0.083 0.032
age 85 or more 0.015 0.022 Alcohol other 0.876 0.854
Couple with dependents 0.266 0.240 No alcohol 0.041 0.114
Couple only 0.356 0.295 Current smoker 0.268 0.207
One parent with dependents 0.023 0.104 Ex-smoker 0.375 0.274
One person 0.355 0.360 Never smoked 0.357 0.518
Income decile na 0.017 0.038 At least one smoker  0.318 0.278
Income decile 1 0.030 0.076 SAH excellent 0.178 0.195
Income decile 2 0.068 0.082 SAH very good 0.334 0.349
Income decile 3 0.098 0.142 SAH good 0.299 0.276
Income decile 4 0.067 0.122 SAH fair 0.136 0.125
Income decile 5 0.068 0.114 SAH poor 0.053 0.055
Income decile 6 0.083 0.093 Arthritis 0.284 0.320
Income decile 7 0.083 0.068 Asthma 0.173 0.216
Income decile 8 0.113 0.073 High cholesterol 0.049 0.038
Income decile 9 0.156 0.071 Any heart condition 0.337 0.436
Income decile 10 0.146 0.040 Diabetes 0.064 0.066
Income decile not stated 0.024 0.016 Osteoporosis 0.014 0.079
Income decile not known 0.047 0.064 Cancer 0.148 0.167
Foreign born 0.274 0.261 Kessler < 20 0.845 0.791
Language not English 0.067 0.066 Kessler 20 to 24 0.086 0.113
Major city 0.618 0.640 Kessler 25 to 29 0.036 0.050
Employed 0.702 0.528 Kessler 30 or more 0.033 0.046





Conditions=5 0.249 0.330  
 
  
Table 2: Means of selected NHS explanatory variables by sex and quintile of predicted risk 
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
Predicted risk % 4.8 7.4 10.5 16.1 30.9 6.8 10.9 14.6 19.9 32.5
average age 43.3 42.5 45.7 53.0 63.8 50.6 48.9 50.2 52.1 54.1
% employed 93.0 89.3 83.5 61.3 23.9 84.0 67.9 53.1 38.5 20.4
% major city 70.0 65.0 63.3 58.4 52.5 69.9 67.5 63.6 60.8 58.0
% not english 9.0 6.2 5.2 5.7 7.3 7.7 8.2 5.7 6.0 5.6
% smoker 30.3 32.9 34.6 33.7 27.8 25.0 26.1 26.0 29.0 33.1
% arthritis 6.9 11.7 23.3 37.5 62.2 12.2 20.2 31.2 41.2 54.9
% asthma 7.4 14.5 18.6 22.3 23.5 13.6 18.2 20.5 23.8 32.1
% cancer 0.3 3.6 8.9 19.2 41.7 4.3 8.0 14.0 21.2 36.1
% high cholesterol 8.6 5.1 4.5 3.8 2.3 6.4 4.5 3.3 3.2 1.3
% any heart condition   9.1 16.3 28.5 44.5 69.7 20.1 31.3 44.1 54.7 67.6
% diabetes 0.1 0.6 1.8 5.7 23.6 2.2 3.7 5.8 8.6 12.7
% osteoporosis 0.0 0.2 0.6 1.3 4.9 2.9 4.3 5.5 10.3 16.5
SAH excellent 44.6 24.8 12.9 5.5 1.0 41.1 25.5 15.9 10.6 4.3
SAH very good 49.4 51.4 39.1 21.6 5.8 43.3 44.4 41.2 31.0 14.7
SAH good 5.7 22.6 41.9 50.3 29.0 14.8 27.0 35.3 36.9 24.1
SAH fair 0.2 1.2 6.1 21.7 38.6 0.8 3.1 7.3 20.6 31.0
SAH poor 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 25.5 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.0 25.9
Income decile 1 1.7 2.4 2.8 3.5 4.7 2.6 4.6 8.5 9.6 12.7
Income decile 2 0.7 2.8 4.2 8.6 18.0 3.6 5.9 8.4 10.2 13.0
Income decile 3 0.6 2.6 4.4 12.0 29.1 3.5 9.1 13.6 18.5 26.5
Income decile 4 2.4 3.6 5.7 8.7 13.1 4.7 8.3 12.5 16.2 19.6
Income decile 5 5.2 6.5 7.6 7.9 6.9 12.7 13.8 10.8 11.5 7.8
Income decile 6 5.4 9.4 9.9 10.3 6.8 13.0 11.7 9.5 7.1 5.0
Income decile 7 8.1 10.5 10.2 8.4 4.2 7.3 9.0 8.2 6.4 3.2
Income decile 8 10.9 15.8 14.9 10.3 4.6 16.6 8.8 6.6 2.5 1.7
Income decile 9 26.8 19.1 16.8 10.7 4.5 14.5 9.1 6.1 4.3 1.4
Income decile 10 24.0 18.8 15.5 12.0 2.7 6.2 5.7 3.9 3.1 1.1





Table 3: Reason for insurance purchase and risk of hospitalisation by sex  
Males % Females % Males % Females %
Financial 0.154 0.148 0.106 0.136
Security 0.267 0.261 0.122 0.149
Choice 0.185 0.210 0.126 0.150
Health 0.059 0.072 0.170 0.178


















Health 0.529 Owner without a mortgage 0.350 0.285 0.408
Sick 0.115 0.068 0.158 Owner with a mortgage 0.365 0.286 0.436
Life 0.180 0.114 0.239 Renter 0.259 0.400 0.134
Contents 0.746 0.582 0.892 Other 0.025 0.029 0.022
Car 0.714 0.584 0.830 age1924 0.031 0.053 0.011
Appliance 0.052 0.040 0.062 age2529 0.069 0.085 0.054
Tobacco 0.237 0.315 0.167 age3034 0.105 0.118 0.093
Lottery 0.050 0.041 0.058 age3539 0.126 0.132 0.121
Lotto 0.307 0.271 0.338 age4044 0.120 0.114 0.126
TAB 0.029 0.022 0.034 age4549 0.093 0.078 0.108
Pokey 0.058 0.061 0.055 age5054 0.089 0.073 0.103
Other 0.139 0.122 0.155 age5559 0.086 0.069 0.100
income 1.049 0.765 1.303 age6064 0.072 0.062 0.082
wealth 4.766 2.473 6.813 age6569 0.059 0.053 0.065
cob Australia 0.739 0.715 0.761 age7074 0.054 0.058 0.051
cob english speaking 0.114 0.119 0.110 age7579 0.053 0.056 0.050
cob other 0.147 0.166 0.129 age80plus 0.042 0.050 0.036
0 earners 0.329 0.424 0.244 nsw 0.248 0.246 0.250
1 earner 0.341 0.349 0.334 vic 0.214 0.223 0.206
2 earners 0.330 0.226 0.422 qld 0.131 0.142 0.121
Single 0.296 0.358 0.240 sa 0.127 0.124 0.129
Couple 0.335 0.256 0.405 wa 0.103 0.100 0.107
Couple with dependents 0.293 0.258 0.324 tas 0.083 0.076 0.090
Sole person with dependents 0.076 0.127 0.030 act-nt 0.094 0.089 0.098
Number of dependents 0.737 0.777 0.702 area na (act/nt) 0.094 0.089 0.098
Male head 0.599 0.557 0.637 capital city 0.611 0.574 0.643





Table 5: Raw correlations of risk behaviours (bold indicates significant at 5% level) 
 
health sick life contents car appliance tobacco lottery lotto tabrac pokey gambling
health 1
sick 0.141 1
life 0.162 0.133 1
contents 0.356 0.134 0.131 1
car 0.272 0.083 0.122 0.372 1
appliance 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.060 0.048 1
tobacco -0.174 -0.010 -0.057 -0.177 -0.123 -0.007 1
lottery 0.039 0.027 0.003 0.042 0.050 -0.028 -0.015 1
lotto 0.072 0.037 0.035 0.122 0.102 0.016 0.035 0.117 1
tabrac 0.036 0.007 -0.009 0.025 0.018 -0.016 0.040 0.009 0.110 1
pokey -0.013 -0.012 0.014 0.016 0.024 -0.007 0.068 0.087 0.131 0.088 1







Health Sick Life Contents Car Appliance Tobacco Lottery Lotto TAB Pokey Other
income 0.685 0.281 0.133 0.424 0.303 0.251 -0.204 0.375 0.131 0.439 0.206 0.158
income squared -0.052 -0.019 -0.009 -0.036 -0.025 -0.041 0.014 -0.087 -0.029 -0.101 -0.069 -0.015
wealth 0.050 0.006 0.006 0.016 -0.001 0.001 -0.013 0.007 -0.025 -0.009 -0.011 -0.001
prescriptions 0.048
specialists 0.273
cob english -0.139 -0.057 0.040 -0.067 -0.091 0.105 -0.015 0.089 -0.062 -0.072 0.022 -0.081
cob other -0.181 -0.125 -0.227 -0.439 -0.203 -0.119 -0.190 -0.040 -0.260 -0.424 -0.467 -0.391
1 earner 0.416 0.450 0.288 0.239 0.431 -0.003 -0.184 0.084 0.149 0.167 -0.041 0.091
2 earners 0.359 0.467 0.440 0.227 0.285 -0.034 -0.133 -0.079 0.170 0.194 0.073 0.104
mortgage -0.083 0.221 0.187 -0.008 -0.247 -0.010 0.195 0.109 0.010 -0.061 -0.026 -0.052
renter -0.538 -0.079 -0.021 -1.359 -0.782 -0.222 0.415 0.076 -0.111 -0.123 -0.030 -0.124
other tenure -0.142 0.017 0.405 -1.197 -0.398 0.012 0.210 0.076 -0.030 -0.141 -0.138 -0.102
couple 0.059 0.028 0.411 0.418 0.635 0.246 0.063 0.219 0.354 -0.098 0.085 0.229
coupleplus 0.045 0.079 0.370 0.442 0.777 0.113 0.037 0.162 0.219 -0.033 -0.162 0.311
sole -0.336 -0.179 0.159 0.203 0.347 0.095 0.058 0.262 0.134 -0.464 -0.162 -0.029
dependants -0.119 0.051 0.081 -0.051 -0.098 0.073 -0.016 -0.045 -0.002 -0.058 0.010 0.003
male -0.103 -0.041 0.012 -0.206 -0.073 -0.088 0.127 0.169 0.103 0.324 0.053 -0.024
age2529 0.364 0.375 0.266 0.240 0.119 -0.083 0.152 -0.333 0.154 0.031 -0.195 -0.206
age3034 0.429 0.388 0.586 0.459 0.176 -0.364 0.068 0.090 0.415 0.110 -0.396 0.077
age3539 0.548 0.423 0.826 0.396 0.045 -0.345 0.094 0.001 0.685 0.367 -0.035 0.153
age4044 0.543 0.477 0.908 0.425 0.055 -0.344 -0.018 0.150 0.685 0.157 -0.197 0.196
age4549 0.604 0.439 0.945 0.407 0.085 -0.497 0.037 0.313 0.889 0.193 -0.188 0.279
age5054 0.598 0.505 1.133 0.264 0.099 -0.399 0.146 0.417 0.932 0.102 -0.105 0.400
age5559 0.688 0.429 0.935 0.650 0.280 -0.405 -0.077 0.412 1.075 0.107 -0.072 0.426
age6064 0.729 0.340 0.864 0.593 0.235 -0.714 -0.171 0.478 1.141 0.353 0.096 0.591
age6569 0.921 0.667 0.883 0.653 0.398 -0.651 -0.538 0.553 1.206 0.276 0.124 0.608
age7074 0.797 0.400 0.796 0.793 0.425 -0.635 -0.834 0.643 1.111 0.016 -0.255 0.706
age7579 0.875 0.556 0.745 0.859 0.129 -1.156 -0.972 0.563 0.977 0.359 -0.099 0.551
age80plus 0.734 0.230 0.655 0.687 -0.236 -1.345 -1.473 0.645 0.704 0.142 -0.307 0.544
vic -0.057 -0.155 -0.181 0.223 -0.045 -0.273 0.019 -0.830 0.097 0.066 -0.170 -0.053
qld -0.045 0.037 0.126 0.305 -0.033 0.134 -0.087 -0.529 0.294 0.043 -0.048 0.038
sa 0.143 0.120 -0.081 0.449 0.157 -0.354 -0.031 -0.088 -0.010 -0.040 0.075 -0.099
wa 0.135 0.036 -0.027 0.234 0.069 -0.169 0.005 -0.857 0.445 0.064 -4.424 -0.055
tas 0.220 0.026 -0.078 0.462 -0.067 -0.269 0.115 -0.661 -0.010 0.065 -0.279 0.022
act-nt 0.212 0.094 0.197 -0.210 0.055 -0.018 -0.086 0.471 0.099 0.251 0.069 0.033
capital city 0.235 0.217 0.301 -0.171 -0.095 -0.074 0.001 0.681 0.106 0.294 0.094 0.213
constant -1.523 -2.539 -2.767 0.088 -0.025 -1.355 -0.479 -2.723 -1.776 -2.774 -1.421 -1.738
Table 6: Estimates from the multivariate probit model (bold indicates significant at 5% level)  
Table 7: Residual correlations from the multivariate probit model (bold indicates significant at 5% level) 
 
health sick life contents car appliance tobacco lottery lotto tabrac pokey gambling
health 1
sick 0.125 1
life 0.142 0.103 1
contents 0.310 0.142 0.083 1
car 0.194 0.053 0.093 0.330 1
appliance 0.076 0.100 0.070 0.108 0.072 1
tobacco -0.182 -0.019 -0.107 -0.177 -0.159 -0.019 1
lottery 0.037 0.038 -0.012 0.039 0.078 -0.078 0.023 1
lotto 0.041 0.041 0.017 0.112 0.075 0.048 0.091 0.177 1
tabrac 0.054 -0.034 -0.055 -0.009 -0.023 -0.106 0.133 0.017 0.289 1
pokey -0.024 0.004 0.038 0.020 0.057 -0.057 0.195 0.168 0.320 0.206 1






Figure 1. Olivella and Vera Hernandez: adverse selection in a mixed public- 
private health insurance system 
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Figure 2. Semiparametric relationship between probability of private health 


















































Figure 3. Nonparametric relationship between probability of private health 









































Figure 4. Semi-parametric relationship between probability of private health 
insurance and predicted risk by reason for buying insurance 








Figure 5. Correlation between risk class and risk preferences (low risk types 
more risk averse) generates favourable selection into private insurance 
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